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Abstract
We consider a game of persuasion with evidence between a sender and a receiver. The
sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to
persuade the receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant).
The sender’s utility depends solely on whether or not the receiver takes the action. The receiver’s
utility depends on both the action as well as the sender’s private information. We study three
natural variations. First, we consider sequential equilibria of the game without commitment
power. Second, we consider a persuasion variant, where the sender commits to a signaling
scheme and then the receiver, after seeing the evidence, takes the action or not. Third, we study
a delegation variant, where the receiver first commits to taking the action if being presented
certain evidence, and then the sender presents evidence to maximize the probability the action
is taken. We study these variants through the computational lens, and give hardness results,
optimal approximation algorithms, as well as polynomial-time algorithms for special cases.
Among our results is an approximation algorithm that rounds a semidefinite program that might
be of independent interest, since, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first such approximation
algorithm for a natural problem in algorithmic economics.
1 Introduction
Persuasion is a fundamental challenge arising in diverse areas such as recommendation problems
in the internet, consulting and lobbying, employee hiring, and many more. Persuasion problems
occupy a central role in economics and received significant interest over the last two decades. A
prominent approach is persuasion with evidence as introduced by Glazer and Rubinstein [14, 15],
which has attracted a lot of subsequent work. In this problem, a sender wishes to persuade a
receiver to take a single action by presenting evidence. The sender’s utility depends solely on
whether or not the action is taken, while the receiver’s utility depends on both the action as well
as the sender’s private information. Consider, for example, a prosecutor trying to convince a judge
that a defendant is guilty and should be convicted, or a job candidate trying to convince a company
that she has the best qualifications and should be hired. How should these pairs of agents interact?
The literature on persuasion games in economics and game theory is vast, see Sobel [32] for a
survey. In sharp contrast, very little is known about computation in this domain, especially for
the persuasion problem with evidence. How does the restriction to evidence impact the computa-
tional complexity of persuasion strategies? Our main contribution of this paper is to initiate the
systematic study of persuasion with evidence though a computational lens.
We examine three natural model variants that arise from the power to commit to certain
behavior. If there is no commitment power, the scenario is an extensive-form game. We prove that
finding a sequential equilibrium is always possible in polynomial time. However, the sender and
the receiver can significantly improve their utility when they enjoy commitment power.
If the sender has commitment power, then she can commit in advance which evidence is pre-
sented in each possible instantiation of her private information, and the receiver seeing the evidence
then takes the action or not. We refer to this situation as constrained persuasion, since the sender
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with commitment power wants to persuade the rational receiver to take the action. The sender
is constrained to providing concrete evidence instead of just making a recommendation as is the
case in the so called Bayesian persuasion paradigm [22]. Constrained persuasion is a natural model
in the example of prosecutor and judge, where the prosecutor (sender) with private information
would first present evidence before the the judge (receiver) makes a decision. Although this sce-
nario seems structurally rather simple, we show that the sender’s task in constrained persuasion
is computationally (highly) intractable. Unless P = NP, optimal persuasion can become hard to
approximate within a polynomial factor of the input size.
If the receiver has commitment power, she commits to taking the action if and only if being
faced with a specific set of evidence. We refer to this situation as constrained delegation, since we
assume that the receiver with commitment power delegates inspection of the state of nature to
a sender, whose incentive becomes to provide convincing evidence to support taking the action.
Constrained delegation better fits the second example, where the company (receiver) can give the
candidate (sender) a test to present evidence on the private information about qualifications, and
commit to hiring her if she performs well. We show that the receiver’s task in delegation is also
intractable – unless P = NP, optimal delegation can become hard to approximate within a factor
of 2− ε, for any constant ε > 0.
These computational differences nicely reflect conceptual differences known from the economics
literature (namely, persuasion lacks the “credibility” condition shown for delegation by Glazer and
Rubinstein [15]). We proceed to study algorithms with matching approximation guarantees for
constrained persuasion and delegation, as well as a number of exact and approximation algorithms
for various special cases. This includes, in particular, an approximation algorithm for a class of
delegation problems that solves and rounds a semidefinite program (SDP). This last result might
be of independent interest and, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first natural problem in
information structure design, as well as mechanism design, where the SDP toolbox is used.
2 Preliminaries
Following [14, 15, 30], we study the fundamental problem of persuasion with evidence. There are
two players, a sender and a receiver. The receiver is tasked with either taking a specific action
and “accept” (henceforth A), or sticking to the status quo and “reject” (henceforth R). The
sender wants to convince the receiver to take action A. There is a state of nature θ drawn from a
distribution D with support Θ of size n. We denote the probability that θ is drawn by qθ. The set
Θ is partitioned into the set of acceptable states ΘA and the set of rejectable ones ΘR = Θ \ ΘA.
We denote the total probability on acceptable states by qA =
∑
θ∈ΘA
qθ, and the total probability
on rejectable states by qR =
∑
θ∈ΘR
qθ.
Both players know D. The sender knows the realization of the state of nature, the receiver does
not. The sender has utility 1 whenever the receiver takes action A, and 0 otherwise. The utility of
the receiver depends on the chosen action a ∈ {A,R} and the state of nature θ. Specifically, she
has utility 1 if she makes the “right” decision — accept in an acceptable state of nature or reject
in a rejectable state of nature — and 0 otherwise. More formally, for the sender us(a, θ) = 1 if
and only if a = A, and us(i, θ) = 0 otherwise. For the receiver, ur(a, θ) = 1 when (1) a = A and
θ ∈ ΘA, or (2) a = R and θ ∈ ΘR. Otherwise, ur(a, θ) = 0.
The sender strives to send a message to the receiver according to a public signaling strategy.
This message should persuade the receiver to accept. On the other hand, upon receiving the
message, the receiver strives to infer the state of nature and make the right accept/reject decision.
We focus on games with evidence, where the messages that can be sent are not arbitrary. Every
state of nature has intrinsic characteristics (e.g., a candidate for a position has grades, degrees, or
test scores) that can be (but don’t have to be) revealed to the receiver and cannot be forged.
More formally, there is a set Σ of m possible messages or signals that the sender can report to
the receiver. We are given as input a bipartite graph H = (Θ ∪ Σ, E), where an edge e = (θ, σ)
implies that signal σ is allowed to be sent in state θ. We use N(θ) ⊆ Σ to denote the neighborhood
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of θ, i.e., the set of allowed signals for state θ. Similarly, N(σ) ⊆ Θ is the set of states in which
signal σ can be sent. To avoid trivialities, we assume that none of the neighborhoods N(·) are
empty, i.e., there are no isolated nodes in H.
We study the computational complexity of games with evidence for different forms of interaction
between the sender and the receiver. In particular, in the case of constrained persuasion, the game
starts with the sender committing to a signaling scheme. A signaling scheme ϕ is a mapping
ϕ : E → [0, 1], where ϕ(θ, σ) is the joint probability that state θ is realized and signal σ is sent
in state θ. Clearly, for any signaling scheme we have
∑
σ∈N(θ) ϕ(θ, σ) = qθ for every state θ ∈ Θ.
After the sender has committed to a scheme ϕ, nature draws θ ∈ Θ with probability qθ, and θ is
revealed to the sender. Then, the sender sends signal σ with probability ϕ(θ, σ)/qθ. The receiver
then decides on an action A or R. Finally, depending on the (state of nature, action)-pair, the
sender and receiver get payoffs as described by the utilities above.
Problem 1. (Constrained Persuasion) Find a signaling scheme ϕ∗ for commitment of the
sender such that, upon a best response of the receiver, the sender utility is as high as possible.
In the case of constrained delegation, the game starts with the receiver committing to an action
for every possible signal σ ∈ Σ, according to a decision scheme. A decision scheme ψ is a mapping
ψ : Σ→ [0, 1], where ψ(σ) is the probability to choose action A. After the receiver has committed
to a scheme ψ, nature draws θ ∈ Θ with probability qθ, and θ is revealed to the sender. Then, the
sender decides which signal σ she will report (under the constraint that σ ∈ N(θ)). The receiver
then takes action A with probability ψ(σ), and R otherwise. Finally, depending on the (state of
nature, action)-pair, the sender and receiver get payoffs as described by the utilities above.
Problem 2. (Constrained Delegation) Find a decision scheme ψ∗ for commitment of the
receiver such that, upon a best response of the sender, the receiver utility is as high as possible.
Finally, in the game without commitment power, we look for a pair (ϕ,ψ) of signaling and
decision schemes that constitute a sequential equilibrium1 in the extensive-form game, where nature
first determines the state of nature, the sender then picks ϕ to provide evidence, and then the
receiver uses ψ to accept or reject based on the evidence provided. Given that the sender picks
ϕ, the receiver shall pick ψ as a best response for every given evidence. Similarly, given that the
receiver responds to evidence with ψ, the signaling scheme ϕ shall be a best response for the sender.
Problem 3. (Constrained Equilibrium) Find a pair of signaling scheme ϕ and decision
scheme ψ that represents a sequential equilibrium in the persuasion game with evidence and without
commitment power.
2.1 Structural Properties
While the persuasion problem with evidence appears rather elementary, it turns out that both per-
suasion and delegation variants turn are NP-hard, and even NP-hard to approximate in polynomial
time. Hence, even in this seemingly simple domain, it is necessary to identify additional structure
to obtain positive results. We mostly consider structural properties of the neighborhoods of the
states of nature.
Unique Accepts and Rejects. In an instance with unique accepts, there is a single acceptable
state, i.e., |ΘA| = 1. Similarly, for unique rejects we have |ΘR| = 1. This is equivalent to assuming
that every acceptable (rejectable, resp.) state θ has the same neighborhood N(θ).
Degree-bounded States. In an instance with degree-k states, every state θ ∈ Θ has |N(θ)| ≤ k.
Similarly, for degree-k accepts, every acceptable state θ ∈ ΘA has |N(θ)| ≤ k, and for degree-k
rejects every rejectable state θ ∈ ΘR has |N(θ)| ≤ k.
Foresight. Sher [30] considers instances with foresight defined as follows. For an acceptable state
θ ∈ ΘA, a signal σ ∈ N(θ) is called minimally forgeable for θ if σ ∈ N(θ′) implies σ′ ∈ N(θ′) for
1We use the terminology of [15].
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every other signal σ′ ∈ N(θ) and every rejectable state θ′ ∈ ΘR. In an instance with foresight every
acceptable state has a minimally forgeable signal. Intuitively, in such a problem every acceptable
state θ has a (not necessarily unique) signal that is maximally informative about θ with respect
to the set of rejectable states. Foresight strictly generalizes other properties studied in previous
work, e.g. normality [5]. Normality requires a signal for every state (not only the acceptable ones)
that satisfies the condition of minimally forgeable, and it satisfies the condition w.r.t. all states
(not only w.r.t. rejectable ones). In addition, foresight is a generalization of instances with unique
rejects, as well as a generalization the class of degree-1 accepts.
Global Signal. In an instance with global signals, there is at least one signal σ with N(σ) = Θ,
i.e., the signal can be sent in every possible state. For example, one can think of “being silent” as
such a global signal. Note that this class is a generalization of instances with proof of membership.
Proof of Membership. In an instance with proof of membership, the set of signals Σ is the set
of all subsets of Θ, and the sender is constrained so that when the state is θ she can only send a
signal σ if θ ∈ σ. This special structure is also considered by Grossman [18] and Milgrom [25].
Laminar Neighborhoods. In an instance with laminar signals, the family of neighborhoods of
states {N(θ) | θ ∈ Θ} forms a laminar family, i.e., for two states θ, θ′ the sets of allowed signals
fulfill either N(θ) ⊆ N(θ′) or N(θ) ∩N(θ′) = ∅. In an instance with laminar states, the family of
neighborhoods of signals {N(σ) | σ ∈ Σ} forms a laminar family.
In an instance with laminar states, consider a connected component C of the state-signal
graph H. If H has several connected components, the instance can be treated separately for each
connected component. Let us consider a single component, or, equivalently, assumeH is connected.
Due to laminarity, there is at least one signal σ that has a maximal set of neighboring states, i.e.,
for every signal σ′ we have N(σ′) ⊆ N(σ). We assume that every state has an incident signal, so
N(σ) = Θ, i.e., every instance with (connected H and) laminar states has global signals.
2.2 Results and Contribution
We provide polynomial-time exact and approximation algorithms as well as hardness results for
the general problems and the domains with more structure described above.
We first consider the case of the constrained equilibrium problem. The existence of a sequential
equilibrium is implied by [15]; we show that it can always be computed in polynomial time by
repeatedly solving a maximum flow problem. We compare the utility obtained in an equilibrium
with the one achievable with commitment power, for the sender and the receiver, respectively.
Formally, we define and bound the ratio of the utilities for best and worst-case equilibria, in the
spirit of prices of anarchy and stability. For the receiver, it is known that the price of stability
is 1 [15]; we show that the price of anarchy is 2. For the sender we show that both ratios are
unbounded. This substantial utility gain provides further motivation to study problems with
commitment power.
Our results for constrained delegation and persuasion are summarized in Table 1. We discuss a
selected subset of our most interesting contributions in the main part of the paper, all other results
are given in the Appendix.
For the constrained delegation problem, we show two interesting non-trivial approximation
results. For degree-2 states, we propose a semidefinite-programming algorithm to compute a 1.1-
approximation. To the best our knowledge, this is the first application of advanced results from
the SDP toolbox in the context of information design, as well as mechanism design. For instances
with degree-d states we give a (2− 1
d2
)-approximation algorithm via LP rounding.
For constrained persuasion, the strong hardness arises from deciding which action should be
preferred by the receiver for each signal. It holds even in several seemingly special cases with
degree-1 accepts, degree-1 rejects and degree-2 states. As a consequence, good approximation
algorithms can be obtained only in significantly more limited scenarios than for delegation. For
unique accepts, we prove strong NP-hardness (i.e. there is no FPTAS unless P= NP) and provide
a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS).
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Scenario Constrained Delegation Constrained Persuasion
Upper Lower Upper Lower
General 2 2− ε (P 6= NP) O(n) n1−ε (P 6= NP)
Degree-2 States 1.1 APX-hard [30] O(n) n1−ε (P 6= NP)
Degree-d States 2− 1/d2 APX-hard [30] O(n) n1−ε (P 6= NP)
Degree-1 Rejects 2 APX-hard [30] O(n) n1−ε (P 6= NP)
Degree-1 Accepts 1 [30] O(n) n1−ε (P 6= NP)
Foresight 1 [30] O(n) n1−ε (P 6= NP)
Unique Rejects 1 [30] 1
Unique Accepts 1 PTAS Strongly NP-hard
Global Signal 2 2− ε (P 6= NP) 1
Proof of Membership 1 1
Laminar States 1 1
Laminar Signals 1 Weakly NP-hard
Table 1: Approximation results shown in this paper, as well as results shown or implied by [30].
2.3 Related Work
There is a large literature on strategic communication, see Sobel [32] for an extensive review.
The works most closely related to ours are Glazer and Rubinstein [15] and Sher [30]. Glazer and
Rubinstein [15] introduce the problem of constrained delegation. They show, among other things,
that the optimal decision scheme in constrained delegation is deterministic. Furthermore, they
prove that there is always a sequential equilibrium where the receiver plays the optimal decision
scheme from constrained delegation, i.e., the price of stability for the receiver is 1. This condition
is termed “credibility”. It is easy to see that this is not true when sender moves first. This
conceptual difference between persuasion and delegation is reflected as a difference in the problems’
computational complexity. Deterministic optimal strategies and “credibility” hold also beyond the
simple model with 2 actions – when receiver utility is a concave transformation of sender utility,
see Sher [29]. Sher [30] builds on the model of Glazer and Rubinstein [15] and characterizes optimal
rules for static as well as dynamic persuasion. Furthermore, and more relevant to our interest here,
he proves an NP-hardness result for constrained delegation, as well as provides a polynomial-time
algorithm for optimal delegation in instances with foresight. Here we strengthen this hardness
result to a hardness of approximation within a factor of 2 − ε (and provide a matching, alas
trivial, approximation algorithm). While this subsumes NP-hardness in general, we observe that
his hardness proof applies in case of degree-2 states and degree-1 rejects, and that it even implies
APX-hardness for such instances.
Glazer and Rubinstein [14] study a related setting, where the state of nature is multi-dimensional,
and the receiver can verify at most one dimension. The authors characterize the optimal mecha-
nism as a solution to a particular linear programming problem, show that it takes a fairly simple
form, and show that random mechanisms may be necessary to achieve the optimum. Carroll and
Egorov [6] study the problem of fully revealing the sender’s information in a setting with multidi-
mensional states, where the receiver can verify a single dimension. Importantly, the dimension the
receiver chooses to reveal depends on the sender’s message.
A number of works in the algorithmic economics literature investigate the computational com-
plexity of persuasion and information design. Computational aspects of the Bayesian persuasion
model of Kamenica and Gentzkow [22] are studied in, e.g., [9, 7, 8, 11, 12, 20, 19], but in these
works there are no limits on the senders’ signals, i.e., H is the complete bipartite graph. More
closely related to our work are Dughmi et al. [10] and Gradwohl et al. [17] who study computational
problems in Bayesian persuasion with limited signals, where the number of signals is smaller than
the number of actions.
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3 Sequential Equilibria
We first study the scenario without commitment power. Our interest here is to obtain a signaling
scheme ϕ : E → [0, 1] and a decision scheme ψ : Σ → [0, 1], such that the pair (ϕ,ψ) forms a
sequential equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1. A sequential equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Our algorithm repeatedly sets up a flow network based on the graph H. In each iteration,
it computes a maximum s-t flow and identifies suitable regions of the graph where it fixes the
equilibrium schemes of sender and receiver. Then it removes the fixed regions and repeats the con-
struction on the graph with the remaining states and signals. After at most min{n,m} iterations,
the algorithm finishes the construction of the equilibrium. For a full proof see Appendix A.1.
How desirable is an equilibrium for the sender and the receiver? By how much can each player
benefit when he or she enjoys commitment power? Towards this end, we bound the ratios of
the optimal utility achievable with commitment power over the utilities in the worst and best
equilibrium. Intuitively, commitment power might be interpreted as a form of control over the
game, so we use the term price of anarchy and price of stability to refer to the ratios, respectively.
More formally, for the price of anarchy we bound the ratio of the optimal utility achievable
with commitment over the worst utility in any sequential equilibrium. For the price of stability
we bound the ratio of the optimal utility achievable with commitment over the best utility in any
sequential equilibrium.
For the receiver, the optimal scheme with commitment leads to an equilibrium [15], so the price
of stability is 1. The price of anarchy is 2 (c.f. Proposition 4.2 below). For the sender, both prices of
anarchy and stability are easily shown to be unbounded. The proof can be found in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 3.2. The price of anarchy for the receiver is 2 and this is tight. The prices of anarchy
and stability for the sender are unbounded.
4 Constrained Delegation
In constrained delegation, the game starts with the receiver committing a decision scheme ψ : Σ→
[0, 1], where ψ(σ) is the probability to choose action A if the sender reports signal σ. The first
insight is due to Glazer and Rubinstein [15, Proposition 1]; for completeness we include a proof in
Appendix B.1.
Lemma 4.1 (Glazer and Rubinstein [15]). In constrained delegation, there is an optimal decision
scheme ψ∗ that is deterministic, i.e., ψ∗(σ) ∈ {0, 1} for all σ ∈ Σ.
Given a deterministic decision scheme ψ, the sender’s problem is trivial: after learning θ, report
an arbitrary signal σ ∈ N(θ) such that ψ(σ) = 1 if one exists. Otherwise, report an arbitrary signal
σ ∈ N(θ). In the following, we focus on the computational complexity of the receiver’s problem:
How hard is it to compute the optimal ψ? What about a good approximation algorithm?
This problem turns out to be much easier than the sender’s problem in constrained persuasion
studied below. It readily admits a trivial 2-approximation algorithm. Let ψA be the scheme that
accepts all signals, i.e., ψA(σ) = 1 for all σ, and ψR the scheme that rejects all signals. The better
of ψA and ψR results in utility max{qA, qR} for the receiver, which is, of course, at least 1/2.
Trivially, the receiver can obtain at most a utility of 1.
Proposition 4.2. For constrained delegation, the better of ψA and ψR is a 2-approximation to the
optimal decision scheme ψ∗.
In Section 4.1 we show that the factor 2 is essentially optimal in the worst case, unless P = NP.
In Section 4.2 we present our results on approximation algorithms. The results on special cases
with optimal schemes are deferred to Appendix C.
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4.1 Hardness
Sher [30, Theorem 7] shows NP-hardness of constrained delegation, even in the special case with
degree-1 rejects. His proof easily extends to show APX-hardness, even for degree-1 rejects and
degree-2 states; we provide the arguments in Appendix B.3 for completeness. Our main result in
this section is a stronger hardness result that matches the guarantee of the trivial algorithm in
Proposition 4.2.
Theorem 4.3. For any constant ε ∈ (0, 1), it is NP-hard to approximate constrained delegation
within a factor of (2− ε).
For simplicity, we sketch below an outline for a reduction that does not give the NP-hardness,
but nonetheless encapsulates the main ideas of the proof. After the outline, we roughly explain
the changes needed to achieve the NP-hardness; the full proof is deferred to Appendix B.2.
We reduce from the Bipartite Vertex Expansion problem. In this problem, we are given a
bipartite graph (U, V,E) and positive real number β. The goal is to select (at least) β|U | vertices
from U such that their neighborhood (in V ) is as small as possible. Khot and Saket [23] show the
following strong inapproximability result:
Theorem 4.4 ([23]). Assuming NP *
⋂
δ>0 DTIME(2
nδ ), for any positive constants τ, γ > 0, there
exists β ∈ (0, 1) such that no polynomial-time algorithm can, given a bipartite graph (U, V,E),
distinguish between the following two cases:
• (YES) There exists S∗ ⊆ U of size at least β|U | where |N(S∗)| ≤ γ|V |.
• (NO) For any S ⊆ U of size at least τβ|U |, |N(S)| > (1− γ)|V |.
The main idea of our reduction is quite simple. Roughly speaking, given a bipartite graph
(U, V,E), we set Σ = U , ΘR = V and the edge set between them is exactly E. To get a high utility
on ΘR, we must pick a signal set T ⊆ Σ such that |N(T )| is small, and set ψ(σ) = 1 for all σ ∈ T ;
this does not mean much so far, since we could just pick T = ∅. This is where the set of acceptable
states comes in: we let ΘA be equal to U
ℓ = {(u1, . . . , uℓ)|ui ∈ U} for some appropriate ℓ ∈ N, and
there is an edge between θ = (u1, . . . , uℓ) and σ = u if ui = u for some i ∈ [ℓ]. Intuitively, this forces
us to pick T that is not too small as otherwise ΘA won’t contribute to the total utility. Finally, we
need to pick a distribution D over Θ such that qA = qR, as otherwise the trivial algorithm already
gets better than a 2-approximation.
As stated earlier, the above reduction does not yet give NP-hardness, because Theorem 4.4
relies on a stronger assumption2 that NP *
⋂
δ>0 DTIME(2
nδ ). To overcome this, we instead use
a “colored version” of the problem, where every vertex in U is colored and the subset S ⊆ U
must only contain vertices of different colors (i.e., be “colorful”). It turns out that the above
reduction can be easily adapted to work with such a variant as well, by changing the acceptable
states ΘA to “test” this condition instead of the condition that |S| is small. Furthermore, we show,
via a reduction from the Label Cover problem, that this colored version of Bipartite Vertex
Expansion is NP-hard to approximate. Together, these imply Theorem 4.3. Our proof formalizes
this outline; see Appendix B.2 for details.
Global Signals In constrained delegation the existence of global signals, i.e., a set of signals
that every state has access to, does not substantially change the receiver’s problem (c.f. [30, pg.
103]). Specifically, if some global signal σ is accepted, then σ will be sent from every single state
of nature, resulting in a trivial solution with receiver utility qA. If all global signals are rejected,
the receiver is left to solve the problem on the remaining, possibly arbitrary state-signal graph H.
Corollary 4.5. For any constant ε ∈ (0, 1), it is NP-hard to approximate constrained delegation
with global signals within a factor of (2− ε).
2We remark that it is entirely possible that Theorem 4.4 holds under NP-hardness (instead of under the assumption
NP *
⋂
δ>0
DTIME(2n
δ
)) but this is not yet known.
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4.2 Approximation Algorithms for Constrained Delegation
By Theorem 4.3 there is no hope for a (2−ǫ)-approximation algorithm for the constrained delegation
problem. Proposition 4.2 provides a matching guarantee.
As a consequence, we examine in which way instance parameters influence the existence of
polynomial-time approximation algorithms. In particular, the maximum degree d is a main force
that drives the hardness result. For the case of degree at most d, we give a 2− 1d2 approximation
algorithm via LP rounding. When d = 2, we improve upon this by giving a 1.1-approximation
algorithm via SDP rounding.
4.2.1 Better than 2 via Semidefinite Programming
In this subsection we give a 1.1-approximation algorithm for constrained delegation with degree-2
states, where every state of nature θ has at most two allowed signals, σu and σv. The approach
stems from an observation that the problem belongs to the class of constraint satisfaction problems
(CSPs); we make use of the toolbox for semidefinite program (SDP) rounding in approximating
CSPs (e.g. [16, 13, 24]).
Consider the integer program (1a) for our problem below. We assume w.l.o.g. that every state
has exactly two adjacent signals; if there is a state θ with a single neighbor σ, we can add a parallel
edge (θ, σ) in H and the analysis remains valid. Note that the integer program here is not the same
as the one used in the previous subsection. An intuitive reason for the change is that the variables
cθ there are redundant: given {ψσ}σ∈Σ, the values of {cθ}θ∈Θ are already fixed. In particular, each
cθ can be expressed as a degree-d polynomial
3 in {ψσ}σ∈N(θ), which is exactly how the integer
program below is written.
max
x ∈ {−1, 1}m
1
4
∑
θ=(σi,σj)∈ΘA
(3− xi − xj − xixj)qθ + 1
4
∑
θ=(σi,σj)∈ΘR
(1 + xi + xj + xixj)qθ (1a)
In the program above xi = −1 is interpreted as accepting when the signal is σi. One can check
that 14 (3− xi − xj − xixj) is equal to 1 iff at least one of xi, xj is −1 (and zero otherwise), i.e., a
state of nature θ ∈ ΘA contributes to the objective only when at least one of its allowed signals is
accepted. Similarly, 14(1+ xi+ xj + xixj) is equal to 1 if and only if both xi and xj are equal to 1.
We will solve the semidefinite relaxation of this program, and give a rounding algorithm. The
SDP is the following, where we replaced xi by wi, to distinguish these vector variables from the
variables of our integer program above.
max
1
4
∑
θ=(σi,σj)∈ΘA
(3− wi · w0 − wj · w0 − wi · wj)qθ
+
1
4
∑
θ=(σi,σj)∈ΘR
(1 + wi · w0 + wj · w0 + wi · wj)qθ (2a)
s.t. wi · wi = 1 for all i ∈ [m] ∪ {0} (2b)
wi · w0 + wj · w0 + wi · wj ≥ −1 for all i, j ∈ [m] (2c)
− wi · w0 + wj · w0 − wi · wj ≥ −1 for all i, j ∈ [m] (2d)
− wi · w0 − wj · w0 + wi · wj ≥ −1 for all i, j ∈ [m] (2e)
wi ∈ Rm+1 for all i ∈ [m] ∪ {0}
Constraint (2b) is standard. Constraints (2c)-(2e) encode the triangle inequalities, which are
satisfied by every valid solution to the original program; these strengthen the relaxation a bit
(see [13, 24]). Let VSDP denote the optimal value of this semidefinite program (SDP). We generally
3Note that linear functions do not suffice to express cθ . In particular, if we rewrite (5c) for θ = (σi, σj) as
cθ ≤ 1−
ψσi+ψσj
2
, then it is still possible to have cθ = 1/2 when ψσi = 1, ψσj = 0.
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cannot find the exact solution to an SDP, but it is possible to find a feasible solution with value at
least VSDP − ǫ in time polynomial in 1/ǫ (see Alizadeh [2]). In our analysis we will (as is typically
the case) ignore the ǫ factor as it can be made arbitrarily small given sufficient time.
It is known that the SDP written above provides the optimal approximation achievable in
polynomial time for any 2-CSPs [26, 27] including our problem, assuming the Unique Games
Conjecture (UGC). However, a generic rounding algorithm from this line of work (see e.g. [27])
does not give a concrete approximation ratio. Below, we describe a specific family of rounding
algorithms for which we can provide the concrete approximation ratio of 1.1.
Rounding Algorithm Given solution vectors {w0, w1, . . . wm}, wi ∈ Rm+1, for this SDP we
produce a feasible solution xi ∈ {−1, 1} (for i ∈ [m]) to the original integer program as follows.
Let ξi = w0 ·wi, and w˜i = wi−ξiw0√
1−ξ2i
be the part of wi orthogonal to w0, normalized to a unit vector.
Our rounding algorithm mostly follows the rounding procedure of Lewin et al. [24], which they call
T HRESH−. First, pick a (m+ 1)-dimensional vector4 r ∼ N (0, 1) r ∈ Rm+1. Then, set xi = −1
(which corresponds to accepting signal σi) if and only if w˜i · r ≤ T (ξi), where T (.) is a threshold
function, and set xi = 1 otherwise. Specifically, T (x) = Φ
−1(1−ν(x)2 ), where Φ
−1(.) is the inverse
of the normal distribution function, and ν : [−1, 1]→ [−1, 1] is a function. Later in the analysis —
and this is essentially the point in which various SDP rounding methods diverge from each other,
e.g. see [31] for the different choices for MAX-2-SAT and MAX-2-AND — we will optimize over a
family of ν(.), exploiting structure in our problem, in order to improve our approximation ratio.
Generic Analysis We now derive a generic analysis for T HRESH− algorithms; note that these
are similar arguments as in [24, 3]. However, in the end, we will pick a different function ν than
previous works, which results in better approximation ratios for our problem.
First, notice that w˜i · r is a standard N (0, 1) variable, and therefore by the choice of T (.) we
have that Pr [xi = −1] = 1−ν(ξi)2 , which implies that
E [xi] = ν(ξi) . (3)
Now, we need to also analyze the quadratic terms. Let Γc(µ1, µ2) = Pr[X1 ≤ t1 and X2 ≤ t2],
where ti = Φ
−1(1−µi2 ), and X1,X2 ∈ N(0, 1) with covariance c (in other words, Γc is the bivariate
normal distribution function with covariance c, with a transformation on the input).
Let ρ = wiwj and ρ˜ = w˜iw˜j =
ρ−ξiξj√
1−ξ2i
√
1−ξ2j
. Observe that the products w˜i · r and w˜j · r
are N(0, 1) random variables with covariance ρ˜. Thus, the probability that w˜i · r ≤ T (ξi) and
w˜j · r ≤ T (ξj) (i.e., both xi, xj are set to −1) is exactly Γρ˜(ν(ξi), ν(ξj)). The probability that
xi = xj = 1 is equal to Γρ˜(−ν(ξi),−ν(ξj)). Austrin [3, Proposition 2.1] shows that Γc(−µ1,−µ2) =
Γc(µ1, µ2) + µ1/2 + µ2/2. Using this fact we can calculate the probability that xi = xj, which, in
turn, gives that
E [xixj] = 4Γρ˜(ν(ξi), ν(ξj)) + ν(ξi) + ν(ξj)− 1 . (4)
With Equations (3) and (4) at hand we can calculate the expected value of our rounding
algorithm (i.e., the expected value of (1a)) for every choice of ν, and compare it against the value
of the SDP in (2a). Specifically, we will aim for a term-by-term approximation. Define the following
quantities:
ℓORν (ξi, ξj , ρ) =
3− ξi − ξj − ρ
4− 2ν(ξi)− 2ν(ξj)− 4Γρ˜(ν(ξi), ν(ξj))
ℓANDν (ξi, ξj , ρ) =
1 + ξi + ξj + ρ
2ν(ξi) + 2ν(ξj) + 4Γρ˜(ν(ξi), ν(ξj))
,
4In other words, the i-th dimension ri is sampled independently from a Gaussian with zero mean and variance
one.
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and let
ℓOR(ν) = min
ξi,ξj ,ρ
ℓORν (ξi, ξj , ρ) and ℓ
AND(ν) = min
ξi,ξj ,ρ
ℓANDν (ξi, ξj, ρ) ,
where the minimization is over all choices of ξi, ξj , ρ ∈ [−1, 1] that satisfy the triangle inequalities
(Constraints (2c)-(2e)). It is now straightforward to see that the term-by-term analysis implies
that, for any choice of ν, our approximation ratio is at most max{ℓOR(ν), ℓAND(ν)}.
Choosing ν and Putting Things Together We are left to choose the function ν that results
in the smallest approximation ratio max{ℓOR(ν), ℓAND(ν)}. We consider a rounding function of
the form ν(y) = α · y + β for parameters α, β to be chosen. Using extensive computational effort,
we found that α = 0.8825 and β = 0.0384 perform well. Once we have a choice for α and β, it
remains to prove the approximation ratio.
We have a computer-assisted proof showing that the approximation ratio is at most 1.1; our
computer-based proof approach is similar to that of [31]. Roughly speaking, we divide the cube
(ξi, ξj , ρ) ∈ [−1, 1]3 into a certain number of subcubes. For each subcube, we (numerically) compute
an upper bound to max{ℓORν (ξi, ξj , ρ), ℓANDν (ξi, ξj , ρ)}. If this upper bound is already at most 1.1,
then we are finished with the subcube. Otherwise, we divide it further into a certain number of
subcubes. By continuing this process, we eventually manage to show that for the whole region
[−1, 1]3 that satisfies the triangle inequalities, the ratio must be at most 1.1, as desired. (The
smallest subcube our proof considers has edge length 0.00078.)
Comparison to Prior Work As stated earlier, our algorithm, with the exception of the choice
of ν, is similar to [24] and the follow-up works (e.g. [3, 31]). However, perhaps surprisingly, we end
up with a better approximation ratio that theMax 2-AND problem5, whose approximation ratio is
known to be at least 1.143 assuming the UGC [4]. To understand the difference, recall thatMax 2-
AND can be written as max 14
∑
(i,j,bi,bj)
(1+bixi+bjxj+bibjxixj) where bi, bj ∈ {±1} (representing
whether the variable is negated in the clause). This is very similar to our problem (1a), except
that Max 2-AND has the aforementioned bi, bj-terms for negation. It turns out that this is also
the cause that we can achieve better approximation ratio. Specifically, these negation terms led
previous works [24, 3, 31, 4] to only consider ν that is an odd function, i.e., ν(y) = ν(−y) for
all x ∈ [−1, 1]. For example, Austrin [3] considers a function of the form ν(y) = α · y. We note
here that, due to the aforementioned UGC-hardness of Max 2-AND, we cannot hope to get an
approximation ratio smaller than 1.143 using odd ν. Nonetheless, since we do not have “negation”
in our problem, we are not only restricted to odd ν, allowing us to consider a more general family
of the form ν(y) = α · y + β for β 6= 0. This ultimately leads to our better approximation ratio.
4.2.2 Better than 2 via LP Rounding
For instances with degree-d-states we take the better of (1) rounding the natural linear program
for constrained delegation and (2) the trivial scheme of Proposition 4.2.
Theorem 4.6. For constrained delegation with degree-d states there is a polynomial-time
(
2− 1
d2
)
-
approximation algorithm.
Proof. Consider the following integer program for constrained delegation (c.f. [15, 30]).
max
∑
θ∈Θ
cθqθ (5a)
s.t.
∑
σ∈N(θ)
ψσ ≥ cθ, for all θ ∈ ΘA (5b)
5This is the problem where we are given a set of clauses, each of which is an AND of two literals. The goal is to
assign the variables as to maximize the number of satisfied clauses.
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∑
θ∈N(θ)
ψσ ≤ |N(θ)|(1 − cθ) for all θ ∈ ΘR (5c)
ψσ ∈ {0, 1}, for all σ ∈ Σ and cθ ∈ {0, 1}, for all θ ∈ Θ (5d)
The variable ψσ encodes whether the action is accept or reject for signal σ. The variable cθ encodes
whether the receiver makes the correct choice when the state of nature is θ. Constraint (5b) states
that, if θ ∈ ΘA, she can’t make the correct choice when she rejects all signals available from
θ. Constraint (5c) states that, if θ ∈ ΘR, making the correct choice means rejecting all signals
available from θ; the |N(θ)| term ensures that the constraint can still be satisfied even when cθ = 0.
Our algorithm first solves the linear relaxation of this integer program; let ψˆσ and cˆθ be the
fractional optimum. We round this solution by setting ψσ = 1 with probability ψˆσ, and 0 otherwise.
We can optimally pick cθ given the ψσ’s. The rounded solution is feasible by definition; we show
that it is a good approximation to the optimal LP value, i.e.,
∑
θ∈Θ cˆθqθ.
Let G = 1|ΘA|
∑
θ∈ΘA
cˆθqθ and B =
1
|ΘR|
∑
θ∈ΘR
cˆθqθ be the average contribution to the LP
objective from the acceptable and rejectable states, respectively. The LP value is G|ΘA|+B|ΘR|.
We start by showing the following lower bound on the expected value of the rounded solution.
Lemma 4.7. E[
∑
θ∈Θ cθqθ] ≥ G|ΘA|d + qR(1− d) + dB|ΘR|.
Proof. First, consider a state θ ∈ ΘA. The probability that cθ = 1 is at least the probability that
we rounded one of the ψσ variables to 1, for σ ∈ N(θ), i.e.,
Pr [cθ = 1] ≥ max
σ∈N(θ)
ψˆσ ≥ cˆθ|N(θ)| ≥
cˆθ
d
, (6)
where we used the fact that cˆθ satisfies Constraint (5b). For a state θ ∈ ΘR, the probability that
cθ = 1 is exactly the probability that none of its signals were selected, which is
∏
σ∈N(θ)(1− ψˆσ) ≥
1−∑σ∈N(θ) ψˆσ . Thus
Pr [cθ = 1] ≥ 1−
∑
σ∈N(θ)
ψˆσ ≥ 1− |N(θ)|(1− cˆθ) ≥ 1− d+ dcˆθ , (7)
where we used the fact that cˆθ satisfies Constraint (5c). Adding up (6) and (7), the expected value
of our rounded solution is
E
[∑
θ∈Θ
cθqθ
]
≥
∑
θ∈ΘA
qθ cˆθ
d
+
∑
θ∈ΘR
qθ(1− d+ dcˆθ) ≥ G|ΘA|
d
+ qR(1− d) + dB|ΘR|.
Our final algorithm, i.e., the better of the trivial scheme and the rounded LP solution, has
expected value at least max{qA, qR,E[
∑
θ∈Θ cθqθ]}. We have that(
2d− 1
d
)
max
{
qA, qR,E
[∑
θ∈Θ
cθqθ
]}
≥
(
d− 1
d
)
qA + (d− 1)qR + E
[∑
θ∈Θ
cθqθ
]
Lemma 4.7≥
(
d− 1
d
)
qA + (d− 1)qR + G|ΘA|
d
+ qR(1− d) + dB|ΘR|
(G|ΘA|≤qA)≥ dG|ΘA|+ dB|ΘR| ,
which is d times the value of the optimum fractional value of the LP. The theorem follows.
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5 Constrained Persuasion
Let us now turn to the constrained persuasion problem. The sender first commits to a signaling
scheme ϕ, which she then uses to transmit information to the receiver, once the state of nature
is revealed. Given that the sender has commitment power and the receiver knows ϕ, the receiver
picks action A if and only if conditioned on receiving signal σ, the expected utility of A is more
than R, i.e., ∑
θ∈N(σ)∩ΘA
ϕ(θ, σ) ≥
∑
θ∈N(σ)∩ΘR
ϕ(θ, σ)
or, equivalently, 2 ·∑θ∈N(σ)∩ΘA ϕ(θ, σ) ≥∑θ∈N(σ) ϕ(θ, σ).
In this case, we say that σ is an accept signal, otherwise we call σ a reject signal. An optimal
signaling scheme ϕ∗ maximizes the expected utility of the sender, i.e., the total probability asso-
ciated with accept signals. Note that if both accepting and rejecting are optimal actions for the
receiver, we assume that she breaks ties in favor of the sender (so, in our case, accept). This mild
assumption is standard in economic bilevel problems (e.g., when indifferent between buying and
not buying, a potential customer is usually assumed to buy) and is often without loss of generality.
This way we avoid obfuscating technicalities in the definition of optimal schemes ϕ∗.
We study the computational complexity of finding ϕ∗ and polynomial-time approximation algo-
rithms. In general, approximating ϕ∗ can be an extremely hard problem, even in the constrained
persuasion problem. Our first insight in Section 5.1 is that the main source of hardness in the
problem is deciding the optimal set of accept signals. We then provide a simple 2n-approximation
algorithm and a n1−ε-hardness in Section 5.2. The PTAS and the matching strong NP-hardness for
instances with unique accepts is discussed in Section 5.3. The discussion of the remaining results
is deferred to Appendix E.
5.1 Signal Partitions
A signaling scheme ϕ partitions the signal space Σ into (ΣA,ΣR), in the sense that the receiver
takes action A if and only if she gets signal σ ∈ ΣA (and R for ΣR). Determining this partition of
the signal set turns out to be the main source of computational hardness of finding ϕ∗: Given an
optimal partition of the signal set, the reduced problem of computing appropriate optimal signaling
probabilities is solved with a linear program.
We prove this result in a general case of the persuasion problem, in which the receiver has an
arbitrary finite set A of actions. Moreover, sender and receiver can have utilities us, ur : A×Θ→ R
that yield arbitrary positive or negative values for every (state of nature, action)-pair.
Proposition 5.1. Given a partition P = (Σa)a∈A of the signal space such that the receiver’s best
action for a signal σ ∈ Σa is action a, an optimal signaling scheme ϕ∗P for the general persuasion
problem that (1) implements these receiver preferences and (2) maximizes the sender utility, can
be computed by solving a linear program of polynomial size.
Proof. Given P = (Σa)a∈A, consider the following linear program (8).
Max.
∑
a∈A
∑
σ∈Σa
∑
θ∈N(σ)
xθ,σ · us(a, θ)
s.t.
∑
θ∈N(σ)
xθ,σ · ur(a, θ) ≥
∑
θ∈N(σ)
xθ,σ · ur(a′, θ) for all a ∈ A, σ ∈ Σa, a′ ∈ A∑
σ∈N(θ)
xθ,σ = qθ for all θ ∈ Θ
xθ,σ ≥ 0 for all σ ∈ Σ, θ ∈ N(σ)
(8)
For each σ ∈ Σa and every action a′ 6= a we must satisfy that E [ur(a, θ) | σ] ≥ E [ur(a′, θ) | σ],
encoded by the first constraint. The other two constraints encode the feasibility of the scheme.
Subject to these constraint, the objective is to maximize the expected utility of the sender. An
optimal LP-solution x∗ directly implies an optimal signaling scheme ϕ∗P (θ, σ) = x
∗
θ,σ.
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5.2 A 2n-Approximation Algorithm and Hardness
Going back to constrained persuasion with binary actions, we start by giving a simple 2n-approxi-
mation algorithm. First, we give a useful benchmark for the optimal scheme.
Lemma 5.2. An optimal signaling scheme ϕ∗ yields a sender utility of at most min{1, 2qA}.
Proof. The upper bound of 1 is trivial. ϕ∗ partitions the signal space into (ΣA,ΣR), the accept
and reject signals, respectively. The expected utility of the sender is∑
σ∈ΣA
∑
θ∈N(σ)
ϕ∗(θ, σ) ≤
∑
σ∈ΣA
∑
θ∈N(σ)∩ΘA
2 · ϕ∗(θ, σ) ≤ 2
∑
θ∈ΘA
qθ = 2 · qA .
Our simple algorithm considers them partitions with a single accept signal ΣA = {σ}, for every
σ ∈ Σ. For each such partition, the algorithm determines an optimal scheme and then picks the
best one, among all m partitions. Instead of solving the LP of Proposition 5.1, given a proposed
partition we proceed as follows. Assign as much probability mass from ΘA ∩ N(σ) to σ and at
most the same amount from ΘR ∩N(σ) — this ensures that σ is an accept signal. The remaining
probability mass is assigned arbitrarily to other signals. Note that if this is impossible, there is no
scheme that makes σ an accept signal.
Proposition 5.3. For constrained persuasion there is a 2n-approximation algorithm that runs in
polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose θ′ ∈ ΘA is an acceptable state from which ϕ∗ assigns the largest amount to accept
signals, i.e., θ′ = argmaxθ∈ΘA
∑
σ∈ΣA∩N(θ)
ϕ∗(θ, σ). Clearly, the optimum accumulates on the
accept signals at most n times this probability mass from the set of acceptable states, and at most
the same from rejectable states. Hence,
∑
σ∈ΣA∩N(θ′)
ϕ∗(θ′, σ) < qθ′ is at least a 1/(2n)-fraction of
the optimal sender utility.
Consider the accept signals ΣA in ϕ
∗ and any such signal σ′ ∈ N(θ′)∩ΣA. When our algorithm
checks the partition with σ′ as the unique accept signal, it finds a feasible scheme, since the
optimum scheme makes σ′ an accept signal and the algorithm only assigns more probability from
ΘA to σ
′. The value of this solution is at least qθ′ .
In addition to this simple algorithm, we show a number of strong hardness results for con-
strained persuasion. The proofs of the following two theorems are relegated to Appendix D.
Theorem 5.4. For any constant ε > 0, constrained persuasion is NP-hard to approximate within
a factor of n1−ε, even for instances with degree-2 states and degree-1 accepts.
For instances with degree-1 rejects a similar result follows with a slightly different reduction.
Theorem 5.5. For any constant ε > 0, constrained persuasion is NP-hard to approximate within
a factor of n1−ε, even for instances with degree-1 rejects.
5.3 Unique Accepts
In this section, we examine instances in which there is only a single acceptable state, for which we
prove NP-hardness and give a PTAS. It will be convenient to state a lemma which allows us to get
a better handle on the sender utility in an optimal signaling scheme for a given signal partition.
This lemma will be helpful in both our hardness and algorithm analyses.
To state this lemma, we need some additional notation: for every subset Σ˜ ⊆ Σ, we use ΘR(Σ˜)
to denote {θ ∈ ΘR | N(θ) ⊆ Σ˜}; when Σ˜ = {σ} is a singleton, we write ΘR(σ) in place of ΘR({σ})
for brevity. Moreover, let N(Σ˜) denote
⋃
σ∈Σ˜N(σ). The lemma can now be stated as follows.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose that there exists a unique accept state θa. For any partition P = (ΣA,ΣR)
of the signal space such that ΣA 6= ∅, we have
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1. There exists a signaling scheme ϕ such that every signal in ΣA is accepted and every signal
in ΣR is rejected by the receiver if and only if ΣA ⊆ N(θa) and
∑
θ∈ΘR(ΣA)
qθ ≤ qθa .
2. When the above condition holds, any optimal signaling scheme ϕ∗ for the sender has utility
equal to min{2qθa ,
∑
θ∈N(ΣA)
qθ}, and, such a signaling scheme can be computed in polynomial
time.
We remark that the algorithm for finding ϕ∗ in the above lemma is a simple greedy algorithm
that tries to “put as much probability mass from rejectable states as possible” in ΣA and then
use the probability mass of the acceptable state θa to “balance out” the mass from the rejectable
states, so that eventually the signals in ΣA are accepted. This is in contrast to the generic linear
program-based algorithm in Proposition 5.1. The simpler greedy algorithm allows us to consider
more concrete conditions and exactly compute the utility as stated in Lemma 5.6.
Proof of Lemma 5.6. 1. (⇒) First, assume that there is such a signaling scheme ϕ. Clearly, every
signal not in N(θa) must be rejected, which implies that ΣA ⊆ N(θa). Furthermore, for all
σ ∈ ΣA, we must have ϕ(θa, σ) ≥
∑
θ∈N(σ)∩ΘR
ϕ(θ, σ). Summing up over all σ ∈ ΣA gives
qθa ≥
∑
σ∈ΣA
∑
θ∈N(σ)∩ΘR
ϕ(θ, σ)
≥
∑
σ∈ΣA
∑
θ∈ΘR(ΣA)
ϕ(θ, σ) =
∑
θ∈ΘR(ΣA)
∑
σ∈ΣA
ϕ(θ, σ) =
∑
θ∈ΘR(ΣA)
qθ.
(⇐) Assume that ∅ 6= ΣA ⊆ N(θa) and
∑
θ∈ΘR(ΣA)
qθ ≤ qθa . We may construct a desired
signaling scheme ϕ as follows. First, we assign ϕ(θ, σ) arbitrarily for all θ ∈ ΘR(ΣA). Then,
we assign ϕ(θa, σ) such that ϕ(θa, σ) = 0 for all σ /∈ ΣA and that ϕ(θa, σ) ≥
∑
θ∈ΘR(ΣA)
ϕ(θ, σ)
for all σ ∈ ΣA. The former is possible because ΣA 6= ∅ and the latter possible because∑
θ∈ΘR(ΣA)
qθ ≤ qθa . Finally, for each θ ∈ ΘR \ΘR(ΣA), assign ϕ(θ, σ) = 0 for all σ ∈ ΣA. It is
straightforward from the construction that this ϕ is a desired signaling scheme.
2. First, we will show that any signaling scheme ϕ has utility at most min{2qθa ,
∑
θ∈N(ΣA)
qθ} for
the sender. Observe that the upper bound 2qθa follows trivially from Lemma 5.2. Thus, it
suffices for us to prove that the utility is at most
∑
θ∈N(ΣA)
qθ. To do so, let us rearrange the
utility as follows: ∑
σ∈ΣA
∑
θ∈N(σ)
ϕ(θ, σ) ≤
∑
θ∈N(ΣA)
∑
σ∈N(θ)
ϕ(θ, σ) =
∑
θ∈N(ΣA)
qθ.
Finally, we will construct a signaling scheme ϕ∗ with utility equal to min{2qθa ,
∑
θ∈N(ΣA)
qθ}.
The algorithm is a modification of the algorithm from the first part, and it works in four steps:
• For every θ ∈ ΘR(ΣA), assign ϕ(θ, σ) arbitrarily.
• For every θ ∈ (N(ΣA)∩ΘR)\ΘR(ΣA), assign ϕ(θ, σ) so that
∑
σ∈ΣA
∑
θ∈N(σ)∩ΘR
ϕ(θ, σ) =
min{qθa ,
∑
θ∈N(ΣA)∩ΘR
qθ}. (Note that this step is possible because
∑
θ∈ΘR(ΣA)
qθ ≤ qθa.)
• Assign ϕ(θa, σ) so that ϕ(θa, σ) = 0 for all σ /∈ ΣA, and that ϕ(θa, σ) ≥
∑
θ∈N(σ)∩ΘR
ϕ(θ, σ)
for all σ ∈ ΣA. (Note that this is possible because, from the previous step, we must have∑
σ∈ΣA
∑
θ∈N(σ)∩ΘR
ϕ(θ, σ) ≤ qθa.)
• All other remaining assignments are made arbitrarily in order to turn ϕ into a feasible
signaling scheme.
It is straightforward to check that ϕ∗ is the desired signaling scheme with utility equal to
qθa +min{qθa ,
∑
θ∈N(ΣA)∩ΘR
qθ} = min{2qθa ,
∑
θ∈N(ΣA)
qθ}.
With Lemma 5.6 ready, we now prove NP-hardness of the problem.
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Theorem 5.7. Constrained persuasion with unique accepts is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce from the Max-k-Vertex-Cover problem, where we have a graph G = (V,E).
The goal is to choose a set V ′ of k vertices in order to maximize the number of edges incident to
at least one vertex in V ′. For every vertex v ∈ V , let E(v) be the set of incident edges, then we
try to pick a subset V ′ of k vertices to maximize |⋃v∈V ′ E(v)|.
For each edge e ∈ E, we introduce a rejectable state θe with qθe = 1(|V |+k)(|E|+1)+2|E| . For each
vertex v we introduce a signal σv. The graph H between states and signals expresses the incident
property of edges and vertices. In addition, for each signal σ, we introduce an auxiliary rejectable
states that have σ as their unique signal. Each auxiliary state θ has qθ =
|E|+1
(|V |+k)(|E|+1)+2|E| . Finally,
the unique acceptable state θa is incident to all signals and has probability
qθa =
k(|E| + 1) + |E|
(|V |+ k)(|E| + 1) + 2|E| .
From Lemma 5.6, the optimal signaling scheme has sender utility equal to
max
ΣA
min

2qθa ,
∑
θ∈N(ΣA)
qθ

 ,
where the maximum is over non-empty ΣA ⊆ Σ such that
∑
θ∈ΘR(ΣA)
qθ ≤ qθa . Notice that, in
our construction, this condition is satisfied iff |ΣA| ≤ k. This means that ΣA = {σv}v∈V ′ for some
subset V ′ of size at most k. It is also not hard to see that
min

2qθa ,
∑
θ∈N(ΣA)
qθ

 =
∑
θ∈N(ΣA)
qθ =
(|V ′|+ k)(|E| + 1) + |⋃v∈V ′ E(v)|
(|V |+ k)(|E| + 1) + |E| .
In other words, the utility is maximized iff V ′ is an optimal solution to the instance of Max-k-
Vertex-Cover. Since the latter is NP-hard, we can conclude that constrained persuasion with
unique accepts is also NP-hard.
We next give a PTAS for the problem. Before we formalize our PTAS, let us give an informal
intuition. Observe that the condition in Lemma 5.6 implies that qθa ≥
∑
σ∈ΣA
(∑
θ∈ΘR(σ)
qθ
)
.
This latter constraint is a knapsack constraint. One generic strategy to solve knapsack problems
is to first brute-force enumerate all possibilities of selecting “heavy items”, which in our case are
the signals with large
∑
θ∈ΘR(σ)
qθ. Then, use a simple greedy algorithm for the remaining “light
items”. Our PTAS follows this blueprint. However, since neither our constraints nor our objective
function are exactly the same as in knapsack problems, we cannot use results from there directly
and have to carefully argue the approximation guarantee ourselves.
Theorem 5.8. For constrained persuasion with unique accepts, for every fixed ε ∈ (0, 1], Algo-
rithm 1 runs in time mO(1/ε)nO(1) and outputs a (1 + ε) approximate solution.
Proof. It is clear that our algorithm runs in time mO(1/ε)nO(1). Let ϕ∗ be any optimal signaling
scheme, with utility OPT for the sender. We prove that the utility of ϕALG is at least (1−0.5ǫ)OPT.
Without loss of generality we assume that the utility of ϕ∗ is non-zero. Now, let (Σ∗A,Σ
∗
R) denote
the signal partition of ϕ∗; since the utility of ϕ∗ is non-zero, we must have Σ∗A 6= ∅. Furthermore,
the first item of Lemma 5.6 implies that Σ∗A ∩ Σ≥ε must be of size at most 1/ε. As a result, our
algorithm must consider S = (Σ∗A ∩ Σ≥ε) in the for-loop (3). For this particular S, let T ′ denote
the largest T for which Line (6) is executed. We next consider two cases, based on whether or not
we have T ′ = S ∪ (Σ<ε ∩N(θa)).
• Case I: T ′ = S ∪ (Σ<ε ∩ N(θa)). Notice that T ′ ⊇ Σ∗A. Lemma 5.6, implies that the utility of
ϕALG must be at least OPT.
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Algorithm 1: A PTAS for constrained persuasion with unique accepts.
Input: Graphs H with a single acceptable state θa, and ε > 0.
1 Let Σ≥ε be the set of all signals σ ∈ Σ such that
∑
θ∈ΘR(σ)
qθ ≥ εqθa . Then, let Σ<ε = Σ \ Σ≥ε;
2 Let ϕALG be an arbitrary signaling scheme;
3 for every (possibly empty) subset S ⊆ Σ≥ε of size at most 1/ε do
4 Let T = S;
5 while
∑
θ∈ΘR(T )
qθ ≤ qθa do
6 If the utility of ϕALG is less than min{2qθa ,
∑
θ∈N(T ) qθ}, then let ϕALG be the optimal
signaling scheme consistent with signaling partition ΣA = T , which can be computed in
polynomial time due to Lemma 5.6 ;
7 If T = Σ<ε ∩N(θa), break from the loop;
8 Otherwise, add an arbitrary signal from (Σ<ε ∩N(θa)) \ T to T ;
9 end
10 end
Output: ϕALG.
• Case II: T ′ 6= S ∪ (Σ<ε ∩ N(θa)). This means that there exists a signal σ∗ ∈ (Σ<ε ∩ N(θa))
whose addition to T ′ breaks the condition of the while-loop (5), i.e., qθa <
∑
θ∈ΘR(T ′∪{σ∗})
qθ.
The right hand side of this inequality is equal to∑
θ∈ΘR
N(θ)⊆(T ′∪{σ∗})
qθ ≤
∑
θ∈ΘR
N(θ)∩T ′ 6=∅
qθ +
∑
θ∈ΘR
N(θ)={σ∗}
qθ
=
∑
θ∈N(T ′)∩ΘR
qθ +
∑
θ∈ΘR(σ∗)
qθ
<
∑
θ∈N(T ′)∩ΘR
qθ + εqθa ,
where the last inequality since σ belongs to Σ<ε. Combining the two inequalities we have∑
θ∈N(T ′)∩ΘR
qθ > (1− ε)qθa . (9)
On the other hand, from Lemma 5.6, when we execute line Line (6) for T = T ′, it must result
in a signaling scheme of utility
min

2qθa ,
∑
θ∈N(T ′)
qθ

 = min

2qθa , qθa +
∑
θ∈N(T ′)∩ΘR
qθ

 (9)> (2− ǫ)qθa ,
which is at least (1− 0.5ε)OPT due to Lemma 5.2.
Hence, we can conclude that our algorithm always outputs a signaling scheme with sender utility
at least (1− 0.5ε)OPT. In other words, its approximation ratio is at most 11−0.5ε ≤ 1 + ε.
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A Missing Proofs for Sequential Equilibria
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We extend the state-signal graph H to a flow network N by adding a source s, a sink t, an auxiliary
edge (s, θ) with capacity qθ for every θ ∈ ΘA, and an auxiliary edge (θ, t) with capacity qθ for every
θ ∈ ΘR. Moreover, we direct all original edges from H from acceptable states to signals, and from
signals to rejectable states. The original edges have infinite capacity. Now consider a maximum
s-t-flow f in N .
First, suppose the flow saturates all auxiliary edges. Consider the signaling scheme ϕ(e) = f(e),
for every e = (θ, σ) ∈ H. This ensures that upon reception of every signal σ, the conditional
probability that the state of nature is acceptable or rejectable is exactly 0.5. Hence, ψ(σ) = 0 is
a best response for the receiver for every σ ∈ Σ. Given this decision scheme, the sender has no
incentive to deviate, since ψ implies a deterministic decision independent of the signal.
Now suppose the flow does not saturate all auxiliary edges. The max-flow min-cut theorem
implies that the saturated auxiliary edges form a minimum s-t-cut in N . Suppose there is a
non-saturated auxiliary edge (s, θ). Consider the set Σ′ of signals and the set Θ′R of rejectable
states that are reachable from θ via an augmenting path. For every reachable signal, all adjacent
rejectable states are reachable, i.e., if σ ∈ Σ′ and (σ, θr) ∈ E for some rejectable θr ∈ ΘR, then
θr ∈ Θ′R. The edge (σ, θr) is never saturated, so any augmenting path to σ can be extended to
θr. Conversely, for every reachable rejectable state, every signal with positive flow is reachable,
i.e., if θr ∈ Θ′R and there is σ with f(σ, θr) > 0, then σ ∈ Σ′. The augmenting path to θr can be
extended to σ by decreasing the existing flow along the edge (σ, θr). Moreover, for every θr ∈ Θ′R
the auxiliary edge (θr, t) is saturated since f is a maximum s-t-flow.
We define ψ(σ) = 1 for every σ ∈ Σ′. This creates an incentive for the sender to send a signal
σ ∈ Σ′ whenever possible. For any σ ∈ Σ′, every rejectable state θr ∈ N(σ) ∩ΘR receives all flow
over signals in Σ′. Hence, setting ϕ(e) = f(e) for every e = (σ, θr) ∈ E ∩ (Σ′ × Θ′R) implies that
N(θr) ⊆ Σ′. Hence, in ϕ the sender only signals accept signals for θr, which is a best response. It
does not change the conditional probability of rejectable states for any signal from Σ′.
Now consider the acceptable states incident to Σ′, i.e., Θ′A = {θa ∈ ΘA | N(θa) ∩ Σ′ 6= ∅}. As
long as there exists a state θa ∈ Θ′A with incident signals σ′ 6∈ Σ′ and σ ∈ Σ′ and f(θa, σ′) > 0,
move this flow to (θa, σ). If (s, θa) is not saturated, increase the flow to σ until the edge becomes
saturated. Both these adjustments violate the flow conservation at σ. Again, setting ϕ(e) = f(e)
for every e = (θa, σ) ∈ E ∩ (Θ′A × Σ′), we see that the sender sends only signals accept signals
from Σ′ for every θa ∈ Θ′A, which is a best response. For the receiver, upon reception of any signal
σ ∈ Σ′, the conditional probability for acceptable states is at least 0.5 (since we only increased the
inflow from acceptable states), so it represents a best response to accept.
We remove the subgraph induced by Σ′, Θ′A and Θ
′
R from H. Then we repeat the procedure
of constructing a flow network, pushing a max-flow, and applying the arguments above. If this
repeated application yields an empty graph, we have processed all of H and constructed an equilib-
rium. Otherwise, the remaining network has only non-saturated auxiliary edges of the form (θ, t),
for θ ∈ ΘR. Then we set ψ(σ) = 0 for every remaining signal σ ∈ Σ. For every non-saturated re-
jectable state θ, we pick an arbitrary σ ∈ N(θ) and increase the flow f on (σ, θ) and (θ, t) until the
latter is saturated. Again, this violates flow conservation at σ. However, we now use ϕ(e) = f(e)
for signaling, for every remaining edge e ∈ E. This is a best response for the sender since all
signals lead to rejection. For the receiver at any remaining σ ∈ Σ the conditional probability for
rejectable states can only increase above 0.5. Hence, for the receiver, it is a best response to reject
and set ψ(σ) = 0 for all remaining σ ∈ Σ.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
For the price of anarchy for the receiver, consider any sequential equilibrium. For every signal
σ ∈ Σ, the best response for the receiver is to choose the accept/reject decision that is correct with
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larger conditional probability. Hence, for every signal the receiver makes the right decision with
probability at least 0.5. Clearly, in the optimum he can be correct with probability at most 1.
For tightness, consider one acceptable state θa and one rejectable state θr, both with qθa =
qθr = 0.5. There are two signals σ1, σ2 and three edges (θa, σ1), (θa, σ2) and (θr, σ2). In the optimal
scheme, the receiver sets ψ∗(σ1) = 1 and ψ
∗(σ2) = 0 which leads to a utility of 1. In the worst
equilibrium, the receiver sets ψ∗(σ2) = 1 and the sender sets ϕ((θa, σ1)) = ϕ((θa, σ2)) = 0.5. The
decision for σ1 does not matter. In this case, the receiver obtains a utility of 0.5.
For the prices of anarchy and stability for the sender, consider one acceptable state θa and one
rejectable state θr, with qθa = 0.25 and qθr = 0.75. There are two signals σ1, σ2. H is the complete
bipartite graph. An optimal scheme for a sender with commitment turns σ1 into an accept signal,
i.e., ϕ((θa, σ1)) = ϕ((θr, σ1)) = 0.25 and ϕ((θr, σ2)) = 0.5. This yields a utility of 0.5 for the
sender.
Consider any equilibrium. A positive acceptance probability ψ(σ) > 0 requires that for signal
σ the conditional probability for θa is at least as high as for θr, i.e., ϕ((θa, σ)) ≥ ϕ((θr, σ)). Since
qθa < qθr this can happen for at most one signal. Suppose w.l.o.g. that this signal is σ1, i.e.,
ψ(σ1) > 0 and ψ(σ2) = 0. Then ϕ((θr, σ1)) ≤ 0.25 and, thus, ϕ((θr, σ2)) > 0. Not that this
implies a contradiction to the sender playing a best response against ψ – given ψ, it would be a
better to set ϕ((θr, σ1)) = 0.75 and signal σ1 always. This shows that in every equilibrium we have
ψ(σ1) = ψ(σ2) = 0. Hence, the receiver always rejects and the sender has utility 0. Both prices in
this example would be 0.5 divided by 0, i.e., unbounded.
B Missing Proofs for Constrained Delegation
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
In constrained delegation, for every state θ the sender always picks the signal that maximizes the
probability to accept. Consider any optimal scheme ψ∗. For every signal σ ∈ Σ, ψ∗(σ) is the
probability that the receiver accepts in ψ∗. We set pmax = maxσ ψ
∗(σ) and pmin = minσ ψ
∗(σ).
Consider the set Σ1 = {σ ∈ Σ | ψ∗(σ) = pmax} of signals with largest acceptance probability
and the set Σ2 = {σ ∈ Σ | ψ∗(σ) = maxσ∈Σ\Σ1 ψ∗(σ)} with second-largest acceptance probability
p2nd = ψ∗(σ) for σ ∈ Σ2. If Σ2 is empty, we let p2nd = 0.
If E [ur(A, θ) | σ ∈ Σ1] ≥ E [ur(R, θ) | σ ∈ Σ1], then it is profitable for the receiver to raise all
probabilities ψ∗(σ) of signals in σ ∈ Σ1 to 1. After this step, the signals in Σ1 remain to ones
with largest acceptance probability. Hence, this does not change the preferences of the sender
and the resulting assignment of states of nature to signals. Otherwise, it is profitable to lower all
probabilities ψ∗σ of signals in σ ∈ Σ1 down to p2nd. As long as the probability stays strictly above
p2nd, the signals in Σ1 remain to ones with largest acceptance probability. As such, this does not
change the preferences of the sender and the resulting assignment of states of nature to signals.
When the probability becomes equal to p2nd, the set Σ1 is joined with Σ2. At this point the sender
might change the assignment due to different tie-breaking among signals in Σ1 ∪Σ2. However, we
assume that the tie-breaking is executed in favor of the receiver. As such, the resulting scheme
becomes even more profitable for the receiver.
Applying this procedure iteratively, we see that the probabilities for signals in Σ1 are either
raised to 1 or lowered to p2nd. In the former case, we proceed to Σ2 and apply the same argument.
In the latter case, we proceed with Σ1 ∪Σ2 and repeat the argument. This eventually leads to an
optimal deterministic assignment with all probabilities in {0, 1}.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3
In the Colored Bipartite Vertex Expansion (CBVE) problem, we are given a bipartite
graph (U, V,E) where the left vertex set U is partitioned into U1 ∪ · · · ∪ Uk; we refer to each Ui
as a color class. A subset S ⊆ U is said to be colorful iff |S ∩ Ui| ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [k]. The goal of
CBVE is to find a colorful subset S ⊆ U of a given size such that N(S) is minimized.
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In this section, we will prove NP-hardness of approximating constrained delegation (Theo-
rem 4.3). The reduction is divided into two main parts. First, we show the NP-hardness of
approximating CBVE (Theorem B.4), akin to Khot and Saket’s hardness of Bipartite Ver-
tex Expansion (Theorem 4.4). This is done in the following two subsections. Then, we reduce
from Colored Bipartite Vertex Expansion to constrained delegation in Section B.2.3; this
reduction is similar to that from Bipartite Vertex Expansion sketched in Section 4.1.
Since we often deal with multiple graphs in this section, we may write NG instead of N to
stress that we are referring to the neighborhood set in graph G to avoid any ambiguity.
B.2.1 From Label Cover to Colored Bipartite Vertex Expansion
We will prove the following NP-hardness of Colored Bipartite Vertex Expansion. We remark
that this is not yet the final hardness we use to reduce to constrained delegation yet; in particular,
unlike Theorem 4.4, the NO case can still have α/t≪ 1. We will “boost” the NO case so that the
coefficient is arbitrarily close to 1 in the next subsection.
Theorem B.1. For any constants τ ∈ (0, 1) and α > 1, there exists t = t(τ, α) such that, given a
bipartite graph (U, V,E) together with a partition U = U1 ∪ · · · ∪ Uk, it is NP-hard to distinguish
between the following two cases:
• (YES) There exists a colorful S∗ ⊆ U of size k such that |N(S∗)| = 1t · |V |.
• (NO) For any colorful S ⊆ U of size at least τk, we have |N(S)| > αt · |V |.
To prove Theorem B.1, we reduce from the Label Cover problem, a canonical problem used as a
starting point in numerous hardness of approximation results. Below we summarize the definition
and hardness of Label Cover needed for our purpose.
Definition B.2 (Label Cover). A Label Cover instance L = (A,B,E, {π}e∈E ,Λ) consists of
• a bi-regular bipartite graph (A,B,E), which we refer to as the constraint graph,
• the label set Λ,
• for each edge e ∈ E, the constraint (or projection) πe : Λ→ Λ.
We say that an assignment φ : (A∪B)→ Λ satisfies an edge (a, b) ∈ E iff π(a,b)(φ(a)) = φ(b). The
goal is to find an assignment that satisfies as large a fraction of edges as possible.
Theorem B.3 ([28]). For every constant ε > 0, there exists t = t(ε) such that, given a Label
Cover instance L with |Λ| = t, it is NP-hard to distinguish between the following two cases:
• (YES) There exists an assignment that satisfies all the edges.
• (NO) Every assignment satisfies less than an ε-fraction of the edges.
We now prove Theorem B.1. The proof is relatively simple and is based on a viewpoint of the
whole Label Cover instance L as a so-called labelled-extended graph, where the left vertex set is
A× Λ, the right vertex set is B × Λ and the edges are defined naturally based on the constraints.
It is not hard to see that, in the YES case, picking a subset according to satisfying assignment
results in a subset that does not expand much into the right vertex set. The NO case can also be
argued as expected. We formalize this intuition below.
Proof of Theorem B.1. Suppose ε = τ2/α and t = t(ε) as in Theorem B.3. Consider an instance
L = (A′, B′, E′, {πe}e∈E′ ,Λ) of Label Cover where |Λ| = t. We construct an instance G = (U =
U1 ∪ · · · ∪ Uk, V,E) of Colored Bipartite Vertex Expansion as follows.
• U = A′ × Λ and V = B′ × Λ.
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• Add an edge between (a, λa) ∈ U and (b, λb) ∈ V to E iff (a, b) ∈ E′ and π(a,b)(λa) = λb.
• k = |A′|. Rename the vertices in A′ as 1, . . . , k. The i-th color class is given by Ui = {i}×Λ.
We will now prove correctness of the reduction. First, it is obvious that the reduction can be
implemented in polynomial time. Below, we will show completeness (i.e., the YES case in Theo-
rem B.3 results in the YES case in Theorem B.1) and soundness (i.e., the NO case in Theorem B.3
results in the NO case in Theorem B.1). Together with Theorem B.3, these complete the proof of
Theorem B.1.
(Completeness) Suppose that there exists an assignment φ∗ : (A′ ∪ B′) → Λ that satisfies
all the edges in L. Let S∗ = {(a, φ∗(a)) | a ∈ A′}. Since φ∗ satisfies all edges in L, we have
NG(S
∗) = {(b, φ∗(b)) | b ∈ B′}. As a result, we have |NG(S∗)| = |B′| = |V |t as desired.
(Soundness) We will prove this contrapositively. Specifically, assume that there exists S ⊆ U
of size at least τk with |NG(S)| ≤ αt · |V | = α · |B′|. We will show that there exists an assignment
that satisfies at least an ε-fraction of the edges in L.
For convenience, let H = (A′, B′, E′), and let us denote by dA′ and dB′ the degree of each
vertex in A′ and the degree of each vertex in B′, respectively.
We define T = {a ∈ A′ | ∃λ ∈ Λ, (a, λ) ∈ S}. Now since S is colorful, we must have |T | = |S| ≥
τk = τ |A′|. Furthermore, for every b ∈ NH(T ), let Λ(b) = {λ ∈ Λ | (b, λ) ∈ NG(T )}. We define a
random assignment φ : (A′ ∪B′)→ Λ as follows:
• For every a ∈ T , let φ(a) be the unique label such that (a, φ(a)) ∈ S. (The uniqueness is due
to colorfulness of S.)
• For every b ∈ T , let φ(b) be a random label from Λ(b).
• For other vertices c ∈ (A′ ∪B′) \ (T ∪NG(T )), let φ(c) be an arbitrary label from Λ.
Observe that, for a ∈ T and b ∈ NH(a), the probability that (a, b) is satisfied by φ is exactly 1|Λ(b)| .
Hence, the expected fraction of constraints satisfied by φ is at least
1
|E′| ·
∑
a∈T
∑
b∈NH (a)
1
|Λ(b)| ≥
1
|E′| ·
(∑
a∈T
∑
b∈NH (a)
1
)2
(∑
a∈T
∑
b∈NH(a)
|Λ(b)|
)
=
1
|E′| ·
(|T | · dA′)2(∑
b∈NH (T )
∑
a∈NH (b)∩T
|Λ(b)|
)
≥ 1|E′| ·
(τ |A′| · dA′)2
dB′
(∑
b∈NH (T )
|Λ(b)|
)
=
1
|E′| ·
(τ |E′|)2
dB′ · |NG(S)|
≥ 1|E′| ·
(τ |E′|)2
dB′ · α · |B′|
=
τ2
α
= ε,
where the first inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the second inequality from
|T | ≥ τ |A′|, and the third inequality from |NG(S)| ≤ α · |B′|.
Hence, we can conclude that there exists an assignment that satisfies at least an ε-fraction of
the edges in L as desired.
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B.2.2 Amplifying Completeness of Colored Bipartite Vertex Expansion
Our next step is to translate the hardness from Theorem B.1 into a form similar to that of The-
orem 4.4. Specifically, we have to “boost” the NO case so that |N(S)| is at least (1 − γ)|V |. We
give a more precise statement below.
Theorem B.4. For any constants τ, γ ∈ (0, 1), given a bipartite graph (U, V,E) together with a
partition U = U1 ∪ · · · ∪ Uk, it is NP-hard to distinguish between the following two cases:
• (YES) There exists a colorful S∗ ⊆ U of size k such that |N(S∗)| ≤ γ|V |.
• (NO) For any colorful S ⊆ U of size at least τk, we gave |N(S)| > (1− γ)|V |.
The proof of Theorem B.4 follows a standard technique of using graph products to amplify
gaps. In particular, it is almost the same as what is referred to as the “OR-product” in [23], except
that we only apply it on one vertex set. We provide the full argument below.
Proof of Theorem B.4. We extend our reduction in the proof of Theorem B.1. Let α = 100γ ·ln(10/γ)
and let t = t(τ, α) be as in Theorem B.1. Furthermore, we set ℓ = ⌊γt⌋.
SupposeH = (U = U1∪· · ·∪Uk, V ′, E′) is the hard Colored Bipartite Vertex Expansion
instance from Theorem B.1. We create a new Colored Bipartite Vertex Expansion instance
G = (U = U1 ∪ · · · ∪ Uk, V,E) as follows.
• U and its partition U1 ∪ · · · ∪ Uk are the same as in the original instance.
• V = (V ′)ℓ is the set of all ℓ-tuples of vertices in V ′.
• Add an edge in E between u ∈ U and (v1, . . . , vℓ) ∈ V iff (u, vi) ∈ E′ for at least one i ∈ [ℓ].
It is obvious that the reduction can be implemented in polynomial time. Before we prove the
completeness and soundness of the reduction, let us observe that the following identity holds for
all S ⊆ U :
|NG(S)|
|V | = 1−
(
1− |NH(S)||V ′|
)ℓ
. (10)
It is simple to check that the above identity holds, because a vertex (v1, . . . , vℓ) ∈ V does not
belong to NG(S) iff (v1, . . . , vℓ) ∈ (V ′ \ NH(S))ℓ. With this identity in mind, we now proceed to
prove the completeness and soundness of the reduction.
(Completeness) Suppose that there exists a colorful S∗ ⊆ U such that |NH(S)| = 1t · |V ′|.
From (10), we have
|NG(S∗)|
|V | = 1−
(
1− 1
t
)ℓ Bernoulli’sinequality
≤ ℓ
t
≤ γ .
In other words, |NG(S∗)| ≤ γ|V | as desired.
(Soundness) Suppose that any colorful set S ⊆ U satisfies |NH(S)| > αt · |V ′|. From (10), we
also have
|NG(S)|
|V | > 1−
(
1− α
t
)ℓ
.
By our choice of α and soundness of Theorem B.1, we must have t ≥ 1α > 2/γ, meaning that
ℓ ≥ γt/2. Plugging this into the above inequality,
|NG(S)|
|V | > 1−
(
1− α
t
)γt/2 ≥ 1− (e−α/t)γt/2 ≥ 1− γ ,
where the last inequality follows from our choice of α. This completes our proof.
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B.2.3 From Colored Bipartite Vertex Expansion to Constrained Delegation
Finally, we reduce from the NP-hardness of Colored Bipartite Vertex Expansion in Theo-
rem B.4 to the NP-hardness of constrained delegation (Theorem 4.3). The reduction closely follows
the sketch in Section 4.1, except that the acceptable states are now used to check the “colorfulness”
of S instead of its size.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. For any constant ε ∈ (0, 1), set γ = τ = 0.1ε. Let (U = U1∪· · ·∪Uk, V,E) be
the input to the Bipartite Vertex Expansion problem. We construct an instance of constrained
delegation as follows.
• For every vertex u ∈ U , create a signal σu.
• The set of rejectable states is ΘR = {θv | v ∈ V }. For each θv ∈ ΘR, its set of allowed signals
is N(θv) = {σu | u ∈ N(v)}. The probability is qθv = 12|V | .
• The set of acceptable states is ΘA = {θi | i ∈ [k]}. For each θi ∈ ΘA, its set of allowed signals
is N(θi) = Ui. The probability is qθi =
1
2k .
Observe that qA = qR = 0.5.
It is obvious to see that the above reduction can be implemented in polynomial time. We will
now prove the completeness and soundness properties of our reduction. Specifically, let OPT =
0.5 · (2− γ); we will show below that the YES case (of Theorem B.4) results in a decision scheme
with utility at least OPT, whereas the NO case implies that any decision scheme has utility less
than OPT2−ε . Note that this, together with Theorem B.4, completes the proof of Theorem 4.3.
(Completeness) Suppose that there exists a colorful S∗ ⊆ U of size k such that |N(S∗)| ≤ γ|V |.
Consider the (deterministic) decision scheme ψ∗ where ψ∗(σu) = 1 iff u ∈ S∗. Since S∗ is colorful
and has size k, every acceptable state is accepted. On the other hand, a rejectable state θv ∈ ΘR
is accepted iff v ∈ N(S∗). Hence, the utility of ψ∗ is at least
1
2|V |(|V | − |N(S
∗)|) + 1
2
≥ 0.5(2 − γ) = OPT ,
where the inequality follows from |N(S∗)| ≤ γ|V |.
(Soundness) Suppose that, for any colorful set S ⊆ U of size at least τk, we have |N(S)| >
(1 − γ)|V |. Consider an optimal decision scheme ψ. We will show that the utility achieved by ψ
is at most OPT2−ε . From Lemma 4.1, we may assume that ψ is deterministic, i.e., ψ(σ) ∈ {0, 1} for
all σ ∈ Σ. Observe further that, if there exist distinct vertices u, u′ from the same color class Ui
such that ψ(σu) = ψ(σu′) = 1, then we may modify ψ(σu) to zero without decreasing the utility
6.
In other words, we may assume that σu = 1 for at most one vertex u in each color class Ui. Let
S = {u ∈ U | ψ(σu) = 1}. The aforementioned assumption implies that S is colorful. We consider
two cases, based on whether |S| ≥ τk.
• Case I: |S| ≥ τk.
In this case, from our assumption, we must have |N(S)| > (1− γ)|V |. Since every rejectable
state σv for v ∈ N(S) is accepted, the utility of ψ is at most
1
2|V |(|V | − |N(S)|) +
1
2
< 0.5(1 + γ) ≤ OPT
2− ε ,
where the last inequality follows with our choice of γ.
6Specifically, the utility with respect to ΘA remains the same, whereas the utility with respect to ΘR does not
decrease.
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• Case II: |S| < τk.
In this case, at most |S| acceptable states are accepted; this means that the utility of ψ is at
most
1
2
+
|S|
2k
< 0.5(1 + τ) ≤ OPT
2− ε ,
where the last inequality follows with our choice of τ .
Hence, in both cases, the utility of the decision scheme is at most OPT2−ε as desired.
B.3 APX-hardness with Degree-2 States and Degree-1 Rejects
The following result is a consequence of [30, Theorem 7].
Corollary B.5. Constrained delegation is APX-hard for instances with degree-2 states and degree-1
rejects.
Proof. Consider an instance of the Vertex Cover problem given by an undirected graph G =
(V,E). For each vertex v ∈ V we introduce a signal σv. For every edge e ∈ E we introduce an
acceptable state of nature θe, i.e., ΘA = {θe | e ∈ E}. For every vertex v ∈ V we introduce a
rejectable state of nature θv. For every e = {v,w} the state θe has two allowed signals σv, σw. For
every vertex v the state θv has the allowed signal σv. The distribution over states is the uniform
distribution, i.e., qθ = 1/(|E| + |V |) for every θ ∈ Θ.
We can restrict the optimal scheme ψ∗ to be deterministic. For an accept signal the acceptance
probability is 1, for a reject signal it is 0. To ensure the correct action in θv, signal σv must be
a reject signal. To ensure the correct action in θe, at least one incident signal σv, σw must be an
accept signal. Now consider any subset Σ′ of accept signals and the corresponding subset V ′ of
vertices in G. For this subset the expected utility for R is
1
|E|+ |V | · (|E(V
′)|+ (|V | − |V ′|))
where E(V ′) is the set edges incident to at least one vertex in V ′.
For an edge e, suppose there is no incident vertex in V ′. Then adding one (say v) to V ′ can
only increase the profit (θe action becomes correct, θv action becomes wrong). Hence, w.l.o.g. we
assume E(V ′) = E, i.e., V ′ is a vertex cover. As such, the optimal decision scheme ψ∗ has a profit
of at least α if and only if G has a vertex cover of size at most (1 − α)(|E| + |V |). This proves
NP-hardness.
For APX-hardness, we consider 3-regular graphs with |E| = 1.5|V |, where every vertex cover
V ′ has size |V ′| = Θ(|V |). In these graphs, Vertex Cover is APX-hard [1]. Therefore, with our
reduction we also obtain a constant hardness of approximation for the objective
|E|+ |V | − |V ′| = 2.5|V | − |V ′|.
C Optimal Constrained Delegation in Polynomial Time
Unique Accepts and Rejects
Let us briefly consider the cases in which we have a unique acceptable or a unique rejectable state.
Constrained delegation with unique rejects is a special case of foresight, since in this case, for every
acceptable state, every incident signal is minimally forgeable. Hence, an optimal scheme can be
found in polynomial time [30]. For unique accepts, there is a simple algorithm to compute an
optimal decision scheme.
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Proposition C.1. For constrained delegation with unique accepts there is a polynomial-time al-
gorithm to compute an optimal decision scheme ψ∗.
Proof. Since there is only one acceptable state θa, an optimal decision scheme must turn at most
one signal from the ones incident to θa into an accept signal (or simply reject all signals). There are
at most m+ 1 such schemes that must be considered. The best one for the receiver is an optimal
decision scheme for the instance.
Proof of Membership
When the set of signals is the power set of Θ, and σ ∈ N(θ) if and only if θ ∈ σ, the receiver’s
problem is trivial: reject all signals, except signals corresponding to singleton sets {θ}, for θ ∈ Θ.
This scheme is obviously optimal, an in fact results in expected utility equal to 1 for the receiver.
Proposition C.2. For constrained delegation with proof of membership an optimal decision scheme
can be found in polynomial time.
Laminar States
For laminar states, we can compute the optimal decision scheme in polynomial time using dynamic
programming.
Theorem C.3. For constrained delegation with laminar states there is a polynomial-time algorithm
to compute an optimal decision scheme ψ∗.
Proof. For laminar states, the neighborhoods of signals N(σ) form a laminar family of states. For
the rest of the proof, we assume that the state-signal graph H is connected, since otherwise we
can apply the algorithm separately to each connected component of H. Moreover, if two signals
σ, σ′ have the same neighborhood N(σ) = N(σ′), then w.l.o.g. ψ∗ treats them similarly with
ψ∗(σ) = ψ∗(σ′). Hence, for the rest of the proof we assume that every signal σ has a unique
neighborhood N(σ).
Since H is connected and signal neighborhoods are unique, we can construct a new graph T =
(Σ, ET ) of signals with edge set ET as follows. There is a directed edge (σh, σl) iff N(σl) ⊂ N(σh)
and there is no other signal σ with N(σl) ⊂ N(σ) ⊂ N(σh). Since the sets are laminar, the graph
T is a rooted tree, where the global signal σ0 with N(σ0) = Θ is the root of the tree.
For any signal σ, if the optimal decision scheme sets ψ∗(σ) = 1 and makes σ an accept signal,
then we can assume that the sender sends σ for every state in N(σ). As a consequence, we can
assume w.l.o.g. that all descendants of σ in T are accept signals in ψ∗ as well.
We use this insight to compute an optimal scheme bottom-up in the tree T rooted in σ0. For
any signal σ, we restrict attention to the subinstance Hσ given by all signals in the subtree Tσ
rooted at σ and the stats in N(σ). Consider optimal scheme for Hσ. There are two options: (1) σ
is an accept signal, and so are all signals in Tσ. (2) σ is a reject signal. In this case, all states θ
with N(θ)∩Hσ = {σ} would be rejected. For all other states θ we can assume that σ is never sent
by the sender, since every descendant (reject or accept) signal is weakly preferred by the sender.
Hence, in case (2) we can recurse and apply the optimal decision schemes for the instances given
by the subtrees Tσ′ rooted at the child signals σ
′ of σ.
The recursive procedure now starts at the leaves of the tree and computes the optimal choice
for the subinstances with single signals. Then, the procedure works bottom-up in the tree. For σ
it compares (1) the all-accept scheme to (2) the combination of the optimal schemes computed for
the subtrees rooted at the children and a reject decision for σ. The better of these two schemes is
the optimal decision scheme for subtree Tσ. The resulting algorithm computes an optimal decision
scheme in the instance with laminar states. The overall running time is polynomial in the size of
the instance.
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Laminar Signals
For laminar signals, we also give a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal decision
scheme using dynamic programming.
Theorem C.4. For constrained delegation with laminar signals there is a polynomial-time algo-
rithm to compute an optimal decision scheme ψ∗.
Proof. We again rely on dynamic programming and a tree structure. Observe that there are subtle
differences to the approach taken in the previous theorem. We again assume that the graph H is
connected, since otherwise we can apply the observations for each component separately.
Consider a tree graph T = (VT , ET ) defined as follows. Each node v ∈ VT corresponds to a
subset Σv ⊆ Σ of signals that represents a neighborhood N(θ) for at least one state θ ∈ Θ (note
there can be several states θ, θ′ with N(θ) = N(θ′)). The vertices of the tree are ordered top-down
w.r.t. the subset relation of the associated signal sets. A direct child of vertex v satisfies Σv′ ⊂ Σv
and there is no vertex v′′ ∈ V with Σv′ ⊂ Σv′′ ⊂ Σv. Due to connectedness of H and laminarity of
signal sets, the root v0 of T has Σv0 = Σ.
For each node v, we define a set of high signals Σhv ⊆ Σv as follows. Consider the subtree Tv
rooted at v with vertex set Vv. Then Σ
l
v = Σv \
(⋃
u∈Vv,u 6=v
Σu
)
, i.e., the signals in Σlv are not
present at any descendant of v (but, due to the definition of T , at all ancestors of v). Note that
Σlv can be empty. Moreover, every signal σ ∈ Σ is a high signal for exactly one vertex. We say
this vertex is the low vertex of σ.
First consider the decision scheme with ψR(σ) = 0 for all σ ∈ Σ. Now suppose we change a set
ΣA to become accept signals. For every low vertex v of an accept signal, all states associated with v
and ancestors of v now have an accept signal in their neighborhood. Consequently, we can w.l.o.g.
assume that all high signals of ancestors of v are also accept signals. Put differently, w.l.o.g. the
set of low vertices of ΣA is“upward closed” in the tree. This is the main structural property that
drives our dynamic programming algorithm.
The algorithm works bottom-up in the tree. At each node v we compute schemes for the high
signals in the subtree Tv rooted at v. More formally, the algorithm computes the best scheme
(denoted ψ∗v) for the instance given by Tv, in which we restrict to states with neighborhoods
represented by nodes in Tv and the signals that correspond to high signals of nodes in Tv. In
addition, the algorithm maintains the best scheme (denoted ψav ) for the instance Tv, which contains
at least one accept signal.
First, suppose there is a high signal at node v. Then either (1) the high signal at v is a reject
signal (and, by upward closedness, all high signals in the subtree Tv rooted at v are reject signals),
or (2) the high signal at v is an accept signal. In case (1), the optimal signaling scheme on the
high signals in Tv is ψR. In case (2), the optimal signaling scheme results from making the high
signal at v an accept signal and using the optimal signaling scheme ψv′ for every subtree rooted
at a direct child v′ of v. Due to the structural properties, the scheme computed in case (2) is ψav .
The better of the two schemes from cases (1) and (2) is the optimal scheme ψ∗v .
Second, suppose there is no high signal at node v. Then either (1) all high signals in the subtree
Tv rooted at v are reject signals or (2) at least one high signal in Tv is an accept signal. In case
(1), the optimal signaling scheme on the high signals in Tv is ψR. In case (2), we consider adding
the optimal schemes ψ∗v′ for every direct child v
′ of v. Note that if none of these optimal schemes
contains an accept signal, we violate the assumption of case (2). In this case, we consider the
subtree Tv′ such that the utility difference between ψ
a
v′ and ψ
∗
v′ is smallest and switch to ψ
a
v′ in this
subtree. Due to the structural properties, it is straightforward to see that the scheme computed
in case (2) is ψav . The better of the two schemes from cases (1) and (2) is the optimal scheme ψ
∗
v .
The resulting algorithm computes an optimal decision scheme in the instance with laminar
signals. The overall running time is polynomial in the size of the instance.
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D Hardness for Constrained Persuasion
We first prove the approximation hardness for the general case, which applies in the cases of degree-
1 accepts and degree-2 states (Theorem 5.4). We then also prove the result for degree-1 rejects
(Theorem 5.5).
D.1 Proof of Theorem 5.4
We build a reduction from the Independent Set problem. In this problem, we are given an
undirected graph G = (V,E). An independent set is a subset I ⊆ V of the vertices such that no
two vertices in I are connected via an edge from E. The goal is to find an independent set of
maximum cardinality. Without loss of generality, we assume there are no isolated vertices in G,
since these vertices are trivially in the optimum solution.
Hastad [21] proved that it is NP-hard to approximate the maximum independent set problem to
within a factor of |V |1−ε for any constant ε > 0. For a given instance G of Independent Set we
build a constrained persuasion problem such that the optimum utility of the sender is proportional
to the cardinality of the largest independent set in G. As a consequence, constrained persuasion
cannot be approximated within a factor of |V |1−ε, for any constant ε > 0.
Our construction works as follows. For every vertex v ∈ V , we introduce an acceptable state
of nature θv with probability qθv =
1
|V |+3|E| . For every edge e ∈ E we introduce an rejectable state
θe with probability qθe =
3
|V |+3|E| . For every vertex v ∈ V we introduce a signal σv. Note that
n = |Σ| = |V | and m = |Θ| = |V | + |E|. For the state-signal graph H, we insert an edge (θv, σv)
for every v ∈ V . Moreover, we add (θe, σv) iff v is incident to e. As such, in state θv we are forced
to signal σv. In state θe, we can choose from two signals corresponding to the incident vertices of
e.
Hence, in any signaling scheme ϕ, we only need to determine ϕ(θe, σv) for one vertex v incident
to e. Observe that, for any edge (v,w) ∈ E, σv and σw cannot both imply an accept decision for
the receiver because
∑
θ∈N(σv)∩ΘA
ϕ(θ, σv) +
∑
θ∈N(σw)∩ΘA
ϕ(θ, σw) =
2
|V |+ 3|E| <
3
|V |+ 3|E| = qθe
≤
∑
θ∈N(σv)\ΘA
ϕ(θ, σv) +
∑
θ∈N(σw)\ΘA
ϕ(θ, σw).
Hence, the set of accept signals ΣA always represents an independent set in G. Moreover, for
any accept signal σv, it holds that∑
θ∈N(σv)
ϕ(θ, σv) ≤ 2
∑
θ∈N(σv)∩ΘA
ϕ(θ, σv) =
2
|V |+ 3|E| .
Thus, the maximum utility that the sender can obtain is at most |I∗| · 2|V |+3|E| , where I∗ is a
maximum independent set in G. Finally, we construct a simple optimal signaling scheme ϕ∗ based
on I∗ using which the sender obtains this maximal utility. For every vertex v ∈ I∗, we pick
one incident edge e = {v,w} and set ϕ∗(θe, σv) = 13qθe and ϕ∗(θe, σw) = 23qθe (since w 6∈ I∗ by
construction). For all other edges e ∈ E, we set ϕ(θe, σw) = qθe for some incident vertex w 6∈ I∗. It
is straightforward to see that for ϕ∗ any signal σv that has non-zero probability leads to an accept
decision of the receiver if and only if v ∈ I∗. Moreover, the total probability that the receiver
accepts is |I∗| · 2|V |+3|E| .
D.2 Proof of Theorem 5.5
We again build a reduction from the Independent Set problem. Given a graph G = (V,E),
there is a signal σw for every vertex w ∈ V . Moreover, for every vertex v ∈ V there is an
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acceptable state θv with weight 1. The state-signal graph H contains an edge (θv, σw) if either
v = w or {v,w} ∈ E. In addition, for every signal σv there is another incident rejectable state θ′v
of weight M + deg(v), where deg(v) is the degree of vertex v in G and, say, M = |V ||V | a large
number whose representation is polynomial in the size of G. Moreover, for every signal σv there is
another acceptable state θ′′v with weight M . The distribution q assigns every state θ a probability
proportional to its weight. Note that n = |Σ| = |V | and m = |Θ| = 3|V |.
For any signal σv, the receiver will pick action A if and only if the signal is sent deterministically
for all incident acceptable states θw. Due to the construction, this implies that no two signals
σu and σv for neighboring vertices in G with {u, v} ∈ E can simultaneously be accept signals.
Consequently, the set of accept signals corresponds to an independent set G. If σv is an accept
signal, the sender will obtain a utility from this signal of
M + deg(v)
|V |M + |V |+ 2|E| =
1
|V | ±
(
1
|V |
)|V |−1
,
since M is polynomially large. Hence, up to exponentially small terms, the utility of the sender is
linear in the number of accept signals, i.e., proportional to the size of independent set. Hence, the
NP-hardness of approximation within a factor of |V |1−ε = n1−ε for Independent Set applies.
E Persuasion with Unique Rejects, Global Signal and Laminarity
E.1 Unique Rejects
In contrast to the case with unique accepts studied in Section 5.3 above, the problem can be solved
in polynomial time for the unique rejects case. The main insight is that we can restrict attention
to signaling schemes with at most 1 reject signal, and then use Proposition 5.1.
Lemma E.1. For constrained persuasion with unique rejects there is a polynomial-time algorithm
to compute the optimal signaling scheme ϕ∗.
Proof. We denote the single rejectable state by θr and its set of incident signals by Σ
′. Note that all
signals in Σ \Σ′ must be accept signals. Our scheme ϕ∗ sends deterministic signals for acceptable
states, but possibly a randomized one for θr. First, for every acceptable state we pick an incident
signal from Σ′ if possible. Now consider two cases.
If the total probability mass of acceptable states incident to Σ′ is more than qθr , when the
state of nature is θr our signaling scheme will randomize over signals in Σ
′ in a way that all signals
become accept signals. Consequently, all σ ∈ Σ are accept signals. This is obviously optimal for
the sender.
If the total probability mass of acceptable states incident to Σ′ is less than qθr , it suffices to
create a single reject signal in Σ′. Suppose σ ∈ Σ′ is chosen to become the unique reject signal.
Then we can use Proposition 5.1 to compute an optimal signaling scheme with ΣR = {σ} and
ΣA = Σ \ {σ}. There are at most m signals in Σ′, hence, constructing an optimal scheme for each
of them can be done in polynomial time. Among these m schemes, the one that maximizes the
sender utility is an optimal scheme ϕ∗.
E.2 Global Signal
In this section, we study the natural scenario with a global signal σ0 ∈ Σ that can be sent from
every state of nature. We think of this as a “stay silent” or “no evidence” option. We consider the
general persuasion problem (as in Proposition 5.1) with k = 2 actions.
Theorem E.2. For the two-action constrained persuasion problem with global signal there is a
polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal signaling scheme ϕ∗.
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Proof. The main idea is that the problem can be reduced to Bayesian persuasion using Proposi-
tion 5.1. Consider an optimal partition (ΣA,ΣR) of the signal set into accept and reject signals,
and w.l.o.g. assume that σ0 ∈ ΣA. Given a scheme ϕ such that there is σ1 ∈ ΣA with σ1 6= σ0, we
design another scheme ϕ′ that never uses σ1: we set ϕ
′(θ, σ0) = ϕ(θ, σ0)+ϕ(θ, σ1) and ϕ
′(θ, σ1) = 0
for all θ ∈ Θ. Since in ϕ′ the signal σ1 is never issued, w.l.o.g. we can assume that in this scheme
σ1 ∈ ΣR. Moreover, in ϕ′ the signal σ0 represents an accumulation of the accept signals σ1 and
σ0 from ϕ, so in both schemes the receiver prefers the accept action when given σ0. As a conse-
quence, both ϕ′ and ϕ yield the same expected utility for the sender. Therefore, by repeating this
argument, we see that there is an optimal scheme with ΣA = {σ0} and ΣR = Σ \ {σ0}.
Thus, we only need to consider two partitions, ({σ0},Σ \ {σ0}) and (Σ \ {σ0}, ({σ0}). For each
of the partitions we solve the LP in Proposition 5.1. If the LP is feasible, we obtain an optimal
scheme for the corresponding partition of signals. The better of the two schemes represents an
optimal scheme ϕ∗ for the general 2-action persuasion problem with silence.
Proof of Membership Proof of membership structure is a special case of the global signal
property. Here we can limit attention to |ΘR| signals of the form σθ = {θ}, corresponding to states
θ ∈ ΘR, as well as the global signal corresponding to Θ. If qA ≥ qR, the optimal scheme ϕ only
sends the global signal and obtains sender utility 1. Otherwise, ϕ sends the global signal for all
acceptable states, and for an arbitrary portion of qA from the rejectable states. The global signal
is still acceptable, and therefore the sender gets expected utility 2qA. By Lemma 5.2 the scheme
is optimal.
Proposition E.3. For constrained persuasion with proof of membership there is a polynomial-time
algorithm to compute an optimal signaling scheme ϕ∗.
Laminar States As outlined in the model section, we can compute the optimal signaling scheme
for each component of the state-signal graph H separately. Due to the laminarity of signal neigh-
borhoods, in each component there is a signal σ that has a maximal set of incident states, which
must be the all states of this component. Hence, σ represents a global signal in this component.
We can apply Theorem E.2 to obtain the following corollary.
Proposition E.4. For constrained persuasion with laminar states there is a polynomial-time al-
gorithm to compute an optimal signaling scheme ϕ∗.
E.3 Laminar Signals
In constrast to laminar states, the condition of laminarity for state neighborhoods does not result
in a polynomial-time algorithm.
Theorem E.5. Constrained persuasion with laminar signals is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce from the Partition problem. In this problem we are given n positive integers
a1, . . . , an. We denote their sum by A =
∑n
i=1 ai. The goal is to decide whether there is a subset
S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} such that ∑i∈S ai = A/2.
For each integer ai, we introduce a signal σi. For each signal there is a rejectable state θi with
N(θi) = {σi} and probability qθi = 2ai/(3A). Finally, there is a global acceptable state θA with
N(θA) = Σ and qθA = A/(3A) = 1/3.
If the Partition instance has a solution S, then we choose accept signals ΣA = {σi | i ∈ S}.
We distribute the probability mass of θA to exactly match the mass of θi for each i ∈ S. In this
way, the sender obtains a utility of 2qθA = 2/3, which is optimal by Lemma 5.2.
Conversely, suppose the sender obtains a utility of 2qθA = 2/3. Then the signaling scheme
must assign the probability mass of θA in a way such that it is exactly matched by the mass
of the rejectable states for every accept signal. Consequently, the set of accept signals satisfies∑
σi∈ΣA
qθi =
∑
σi∈ΣA
2ai/(3A) = A/(3A), or put differently,
∑
σi∈ΣA
ai = A/2. Hence, the set of
accept signals infers a solution for the Partition instance.
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We leave a non-trivial approximation algorithm for constrained persuasion with laminar signals
as an interesting open problem.
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